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course, we bear the sole responsability for any remaining errors.Résumé :  Dans cet article, nous présentons un modèle collectif de
comportement du ménage basé sur l’efficacité parétienne. Nous
supposons également que (i) chaque membre du ménage est égoiste et
la consommation est privée, (ii) il existe un ensemble de facteurs de
distribution et (iii) il y a un bien exclusif. Ensuite, nous dérivons les
restrictions testables impliquées par ces hypothèses.
Abstract :  In this paper, we present a collective model of household
demand based on Pareto-efficiency. In addition, we suppose that (i) each
household member is egoistic and consumption is purely private, (ii)
there is a set of distribution factors and (iii) there is one exclusive good.
Then we derive the testable restrictions which are implied by this
theoretical setting.
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distribution, matrice de Slutsky
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In demand analysis, it is generally assumed that the many-person household
can be treated as though it maximizes a single utility function under a budget
constraint. Methodologically, however, this approach stands on weak grounds:
it is clear that utility theory applies to individuals and not to households. See
Pollak and Lundberg (1996) for a discussion of this issue.
During the last decade, several authors have aimed at explicitly taking into
account the individualistic elements of the situation. In an unpublished paper,
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) explore what a collective rep-
resentation of household behavior implies for the properties of demands in the
case where prices are constant. They adopt the theoretical framework previously
used by Chiappori (1988, 1992) for studying labor supply: each household mem-
ber is characterized by his (her) own preferences and the decision process results
in Pareto e¢cient outcome. They next consider various models depending on
the nature of goods (private or public) and the form of preferences (altruistic
or egoistic). The underlying idea of these authors is to use a set of exogenous
variables, called ‘distribution factors’, which in‡uence the decision process with-
out a¤ecting the budget set or preferences. Then, the speci…c form taken by
the in‡uence of these variables implies restrictions on household behavior; see
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) for an empirical appli-
cation. Moreover, if agents are egoistic and consumption is purely private, some
structural components, such as the internal rule which determines the distribu-
tion of welfare within the household, can be recovered from observed behavior
— an essential requirement when considering policy issues which involve indi-
vidual welfare (see Alderman et al. (1995) for a discussion). This theoretical
result is actually valid in a quite general context; in particular, observability of
individual consumption is not required. However, things are much simpler when
there is at least one exclusive good, i.e., a good which is consumed by only one
person in the household.1 More recently, Chiappori and Ekeland (2002a, 2002b)
have extended this setting to incorporate variable prices. They consider a wide
range of collective models (including a model with egoistic agents and private
consumption) and demonstrate that household demands must always satisfy a
symmetry plus rank one condition (SR1) on the Slutsky matrix; moreover, this
condition is su¢cient when there is no distribution factor. Finally, Browning
and Chiappori (1998) test the SR1 condition on data drawn from a series of
surveys of household expenditures from Canada.
The present paper completes this growing literature. In what follows, we
study the properties of a collective model of household demand with variable
prices under a triplet of distinctive assumptions. To be precise, we suppose the
following:
a. Each household member is egoistic (or altruistic in a ‘caring’ sense) and
consumption is purely private.
1If a good is consumed by only one person in the household, the individual consumption
of this good is observed and, of course, coincides with the household consumption.
3b. There is one good which is exclusively consumed by one member.
c. There is at least one distribution factor.
It is fair to say that the implications of these assumptions are well-known for
collective models with constant prices. They are investigated by Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori (1995) and, in a slightly di¤erent context, by Donni
(2001). Still, there does not exist, to the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive
study of the collective model of household demand based on (a)–(c) when prices
vary. The main contribution of the present paper is to …ll this gap. Scienti…c
curiosity, however, is not the only motivation here. As it will be clear in the
remainder of the text, these assumptions have a set of consequences which are
very attractive, especially when identi…cation issues are involved. At this stage,
we may remark that (a) is necessary to identify some structural components of
the decision process2 whereas the conjunction of (b) and (c) permits to greatly
simplify the theoretical developments (moreover, it is actually impossible to
identify useful structural components if neither (b) nor (c) is supposed; see
Chiappori and Ekeland (2002b)). By comparison, Bourguignon, Browning and
Chiappori (1995) consider a model with constant prices based only on (a) and
(c), but the proof of identi…cation turns out to be particularly complicated.3
In considering the derivation of the main results, we have found it pro…table
to use a concept of ‘conditional’ functions, previously developed by Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori (1995), whereby the demand for one good is expressed
as a function of the demand for another good. Our results can then be sum-
marized as follows. Firstly, we demonstrate that household demands have to
satisfy a symmetry and negativity condition, analogue to the Slutsky condi-
tion, and more tractable than the SR1 condition of Browning, Chiappori and
Ekeland. Secondly, we derive a set of simple restrictions resulting from both
the structure of preferences and the presence of distribution factors. These are
di¤erent from those presented in the literature until now. Thirdly, we show
that some elements of the decision process can be identi…ed from observation
of household demands. Precisely, the individual Marshallian demands and the
internal rule which determines the distribution of welfare within the household
can be partially recovered. In conclusion, it must be stressed that the derivation
of all these results turns out to be particularly simple and elegant (simplicity is
a relative guarantee of robustness in the case of empirical implementations).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the theoretical
model and its assumptions and, in Section 3, we present the main results. In
Section 4, we brie‡y conclude.
2We must admit, to be precise, that recent studies by Donni (2002) and Chiappori and
Ekeland (2002b) demonstrate that the privateness of consumption is not essential for identify-
ing structural elements of the decision process. However, it is absolutely required that agents
are egoistic or ‘caring’.
3Other identi…cation results, not mentioned here, come from the labor supply context (see
Chiappori (1988, 1992) Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) and Chiappori and Ekeland
(2002b) for example). They are based on a pair of exclusive goods.
42 The Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We consider the case of two-member (say A and B) households. Individual
demands for good n (n = 1;::: ;N) are denoted by ZAn and ZBn with prices
Pn. We only observe the aggregate consumption Zn = ZAn + ZBn at the
household level; ZAn and ZBn are treated as unobservable. However, there is
one good, denoted by X, which is exclusively consumed by member A (say) with
price Q. Exogenous income is denoted by Y . Let ZA = (ZA1;::: ;ZAN) and
ZB = (ZB1;::: ;ZBN) be the vectors of consumptions and P = (P1;::: ;PN)
the vector of prices. We make the following assumption on preferences.
Assumption 1 Household membersare characterized by ‘egoistic’utility func-
tions of the form uA(X;ZA) and uB(ZB) which are increasing and strongly
concave in all their arguments.
Two points must be stressed. First, the agents are said ‘egoistic’ in the
sense that their utility only depends on their own consumption. This is more
restrictive than the case considered by Browning and Chiappori (1998) where
the utility also depends on the partner’s consumption.4 Second, the concept
of exclusive good is explained in greater depth by Bourguignon, Browning and
Chiappori (1995). The most typical example is given by clothes inasmuch as
some pieces of clothing in the household are always worn by the husband and
others by the wife. This idea is at the heart of several empirical applications, for
instance, by Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene(1994) and Donni
(2002). Another important, but more questionable, example of exclusive good,
which comes from collective models of labor supply, is leisure.
We adopt the collective approach where the household decisions result in
Pareto-e¢cient outcomes and no additional assumptions is made about the
process. This is common and does not deserve a justi…cation.
Assumption 2 The outcome of the decision process is Pareto-e¢cient.
E¢ciency essentially means that there exists a scalar ¹ such that the house-
hold behavior is a solution to the following program:
max
fZA;ZB;Xg
(1 ¡¹) ¢uA(X;ZA) +¹ ¢uB(ZB) (¯ P)
with respect to
P0 ¢ (ZA + ZB) + Q ¢X = Y;
where ¹ 2]0;1[ has an obvious interpretation as a ‘distribution of power’ index.
This index is assumed to be a single-valued and di¤erentiable function of P,
4However, all the results immediately extend to the case of ‘caring’ agents, with utility
functions represented by the form: Wi(uA(X;ZA);uB(ZB)), as usual.
5Q, Y and S where S = (S1;::: ;SJ) is a vector of distribution factors, such
as de…ned in the introduction. The most useful example is given by variables
that describe the respective contribution of each member to the total exogenous
income (in standard theory, only total exogenous income should matter for
explaining household behavior). Typical examples can also be found in family
economics: the state of the market for marriage, the legislation on divorce or
the respective male and female unemployment rates.
The next step is to introduce what we call the sharing rule. To do that, we
present a classical result.
Proposition 1 The demands ¹ X(P;Q;Y;S), ¹ ZA(P;Q;Y;S) and ¹ ZB(P;Q;Y;S)
are solutions to (¯ P) if and only if there exists a function ½ such that ¹ X(P;Q;Y;
S), ¹ ZA(P;Q;Y;S) and ¹ ZB(P;Q;Y;S) are solutions to
maxfX;ZAg uA(X;ZA) subject to P0 ¢ ZA + Q ¢ X = ½ ; (1)
maxfZBg uB(ZB) subject to P 0 ¢ZB = Y ¡ ½ ; (2)
for any (P;Q;Y;S).
P roof. A straightforward application of the First and the Second Theorems
of Welfare Economics; see also Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995).
The function ½(P;Q;Y;S); which denotes the part of exogenous income
that person A receives, is the ‘sharing rule’; the latter summarizes the deci-









Bn are traditional Marshallian demands. In particular, they sat-
isfy the well-known restrictions of demand analysis in the single-utility frame-
work (adding-up, homogeneity, symmetry and negativity). We assume here that
the functions in the left-hand-side of (3) and (4) are observed.
2.2 Conditional Demands
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) de…ne a type of conditional de-
mands that turns out to be useful in the extended rational setting at stake
here. Let us assume that the demand for the exclusive good is (locally) non
constant on one distribution factor (say S1, without loss of generality), i.e.,
XS1 6= 0, where FV stands for the partial di¤erential of function F with respect
to variable V . Then ¹ X(P;Q;Y;S) can be inverted on this factor:
S1 = S1(P;Q;Y;S¡1;X);
where S¡1 is the vector of distribution factors without the …rst element. Let
us substitute this into the demand for the nth good to obtain the conditional
6demands:
~ Zn(P;Q;Y;X) = ³
An(P;Q;·(P;Q;X)) +³
Bn(P;Y ¡ ·(P;Q;X)); (5)
where · is the conditional sharing rule.5 We use the fact here that the knowledge
of the prices and the level of the exclusive good completely determines the share
of A (this comes from the functional structure (3)). That is to say, the condi-
tioning good is a ‘su¢cient statistics’ for describing the vector of distribution
factors and the exogenous income in the conditional sharing rule.
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the conditional demands and
the conditional sharing rule exist and are three times continuously di¤erentiable
in all their arguments. To begin with, we de…ne Z = (Z1;::: ;ZN)0 and give
two trivial properties that any system of conditional demands has to satisfy.
These do not require a formal proof.
Proposition 2 The system of conditional demands ~ Z(Q;P;Y;X) satis…es the
adding-up restriction ~ Z0 ¢ P = Y ¡ X ¢ Q.
Proposition 3 The system of conditional demands ~ Z(Q;P;Y;X) satis…es the
restriction ~ ZS0 = 0.
Another version of the second restriction can be found in Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori(1995). In a simple interpretation, this restriction says
that the distribution factors are valid instruments to account for the probable
endogeneity of the demand for the conditioning good in the estimation of (5).
This makes a particularly simple test of the collective approach.
2.3 An Illustrative Example
To clarify the preceding section, we present here a parametric example. We
assume that individual demands can be represented by the Linear Expenditure
System:
XQ = ®AXQ + ¯
AX ¢ (Y A ¡®AXQ ¡N
r=1 ®ArPr) (6)
and
ZnPn = ®AnPn +¯
An ¢ (Y A ¡ ®AXQ ¡N
r=1 ®ArPr)
+®BnPn +¯
Bn ¢ (Y B ¡N
r=1 ®BrPr) (7)
where Y A = ½ and Y B = Y ¡ ½ denote the endowment of each member. We
invert (6) with respect to Y A and, using Y B = Y ¡ Y A, we introduce the
















AX ) ¢(XQ ¡ ®AXQ): (8)
5This type of demand is called y – demand by Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori
(1995) because they denote the vector of distribution factors by y. This name is a little
unfortunate, specially here, since it arbitrarily depends on the notation.
7A few remarks are in order at this stage. First, it is straightforward, although
somewhat tedious, to show that the Slutsky e¤ects, computed from (8), are gen-
erally not symmetrical. Second, the parameters ®An and ®Bn which represent
the price e¤ects cannot be identi…ed; only the sum ®An +®Bn can be retrieved
from the estimation of (8). All the other parameters are identi…able. We will
see below that these properties are much more general than it may seem at a
…rst glance.
3 Main Results
3.1 Observation of One Conditional Demand
The next result says that some elements of the conditional sharing rule and
the Marshallian demands can be identi…ed from the observation of only one
conditional demand.
Proposition 4 Let us assume that ~ Zn
Y Y 6= 0 and ~ Zn
Y X 6= 0. Then, the condi-













Moreover, some elements of the Marshallian demands ³
An, ³
Bn and Â are iden-
ti…ed as well.
P roof. If we use (5) and di¤erentiate the conditional demand with respect





If we di¤erentiate again this expression (9) with respect to Y , we obtain the
second order husband’s income e¤ect:
~ Zn
Y Y = ³
Bn
Y Y : (10)
Finally, if we di¤erentiate again (9) with respect to Q and X, we obtain:
~ Z
n
Y Q = ¡³
Bn
Y Y ¢ ·Q; and ~ Z
n
Y X = ¡³
Bn
Y Y ¢ ·X: (11)
From these equations (10) and (11), the derivatives of the conditional sharing












8To obtain other elements of the Marshallian demands, let us di¤erentiate the
conditional demand with respect to Q and X and replace ³
Bn
Y ; ·Q and ·X by
their values. We have:
³
An
Y = ~ Zn








Q = ~ Zn







To obtain elements of the Marshallian demand for the exclusive good, let us
use the implicit de…nition of the conditional sharing rule X = Â(P;Q;·), apply













This result can be interpreted in two distinct ways. In a …rst interpretation,
it means that there is no need to model the determination of the conditioning
good explicitly to obtain information on the household decision process. Some
useful structural elements can be derived from the estimation of one conditional
demand. Still, the interpretation of the conditional sharing rule is unclear. In a
second interpretation, thisresult means that the modelling of the demand for one
aggregate good and one exclusive good allows us to partially identify the sharing
rule as a function of the usual exogenous variables P;Q;Y and S. Indeed,
it su¢ces to introduce the demand for the exclusive good in the conditional
sharing rule to obtain the traditional sharing rule since ·(P;Q; ¹ X(P;Q;Y;S)) =
½(P;Q;Y;S).
The next basic result is that it is possible to derive from the collective setting
a set of testable restrictions on observable behavior.
Proposition 5 Let us assume that ~ Zn
Y Y 6= 0; ~ Zn
Y Q 6= 0 and ~ Zn
Y X 6= 0. Then,
the conditional demand ~ Zn(P;Q;Y;X) is homogeneous of degree zero in P, Q














































































9P roof. See Appendix A1.
These conditions provide a simple test of collective rationality under speci…c
assumptions (namely, egoistic agents with purely private consumption, one ex-
clusive good and one (at least) distribution factor). They are not su¢cient; in
the next section, we present one further inequality that any conditional demand
has to satisfy (see Proposition 6). One preliminary remark is that the homo-
geneity of the conditional demands is not a trivial property as it may seem.
Indeed, we do not assume here that the function ¹, which represents the dis-
tribution of power within the household, is homogeneous of degree zero. By
comparison, the more usual demands (3) and (4) are not necessarily homoge-
neous. The other conditions (1)–(4) are completely di¤erent from those used
by Browning and Chiappori (1998) in their empirical application and can be
interpreted as follows. The …rst condition is a translation of the Slutsky nega-
tivity for the exclusive good in the collective context. The second and the third
conditions correspond to the homogeneity of the demand for the exclusive good.
The fourth condition results from the separable structure of the conditional de-
mands (5). Concerning this condition, a related, although less general, result
can be found in Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) in the context of
demand analysis with constant prices.
3.2 A Complete System of Conditional Demands
More can be obtained when several conditional demands, rather than a sin-
gle one, are observed. To begin with, let us de…ne SX = ( ~ Zn
Y Y =~ Zn
Y X) ¢ X +
( ~ Zn
Y Q=~ Zn
Y X). It is shown in the proof of Proposition 6 that this expression does
not depend on n. We may now derive a generalized Slutsky matrix and another
constraint. This is formally expressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Let us assume that ~ Zn
Y Y 6= 0; ~ Zn
Y Q 6= 0 and ~ Zn
Y X 6= 0 for any
n. Then, the system of conditional demands ~ Z(P;Q;Y;X) satis…es the following
restrictions:
1. ~ ZY Q ¢ ~ Z
0
Y Y and ~ ZY X ¢ ~ Z0
Y Y are symmetrical matrices,
2. ~ ZP 0 + ~ ZY ¢ ~ Z0 + ~ ZX ¢( ~ ZQ + ~ ZY ¢X)0 ¡ ~ ZX ¢SX ¢ ~ Z0
X is a symmetrical and
negative de…nite matrix.
P roof. See Appendix A2.
A few remarks are in order. Firsly, the …rst condition results from the
separable structure of the conditional demands (5). The main di¤erence, with
the fourth condition in Proposition 5, is that the constraints here are based
on a second, rather than a third order partial di¤erential equation, which is
more restrictive. Secondly, the symmetry and negativity of the conditional
demands here can be related to the main result in Browning and Chiappori
(1998) which states that the Slutsky matrix has to be equal to the sum of a
symmetric matrix and a rank one matrix. We obtain, in the present context, a
similar result except that the rank one matrix is here observed. This condition
10is thus stronger. Thirdly, an implication of the second condition in Proposition
7 is:
~ Zn
Pn + ~ Zn
Y ¢ ~ Zn +( ~ Zn
Q + ~ Zn














¢ ( ~ Zn
X)2 < 0
This inequality, although intricate, can be tested with usual single-equation
techniques. The left-hand-side of this expression corresponds, in fact, to the
sum of the own-price substitution e¤ects for each member. Fourthly, another
implication of the symmetry condition in Proposition 6 is that
~ ZP 0 + ~ ZY ¢ ~ Z0 + ( ~ ZQ + ~ ZY ¢ X) ¢ ~ Z0
X
is symmetrical since the matrix ~ ZX ¢SX ¢ ~ Z0
X is symmetrical.
3.3 An Extended Almost Ideal Demand System
It is not too di¢cult to implement these conditions on a functional form. As an
illustration, we may consider a simple generalization of the AI Demand System










where © is de…ned, as usual, by
© = ®0 +
N





By comparison with the traditional AIDS, the expenditure on the conditioning
good here is subtracted from the exogenous income. Moreover, there is one
more term in QX ¢(Y ¡ QX)¡1 ¢ logX.
To be consistent with collective rationality, the parameters have to satisfy





s=1®s = 1; N
s=1¯st = 0; N
s=1°s = 0; N
s=1±s = 0:
Moreover, it is also possible to retrieve some elements of the decision process






















Some derivatives of the demand for the exclusive good and the conditional
sharing rule can also be recovered but this is left to the reader.
114 Conclusion
In the present paper, we have presented a collective model of household demand
based on Pareto-e¢ciency and three distinctive hypotheses: (i) each household
member is egoistic and consumption is purely private, (ii) there is one exclusive
good and (iii) there is a set of distribution factors.
The resulting restrictions on household behavior are especially simple when
we use a conditional approach to specify household demands. They can be
readily incorporated in an extended form of the well-known AI Demand Sys-
tem (which may be generalized, if necessary). This system of conditional de-
mands must not be confused with the more usual notion of conditional de-
mands whereby the quantity for one set of goods is conditioned on the price
of these goods, total expenditure on these goods and the quantities of another
set of goods. Browning and Meghir (1991) use these conditional demands, in
the single-utility approach, to take into account labor supply as a conditioning
good. A similar strategy can be followed here if we de…ne the exclusive good as
the wife’s labor supply (the husband’s labor supply is probably not su¢ciently
‡exible for that purpose).
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 6




P0 ¢P + ³
An
Q ¢Q + ³
An
Y ¢ · = 0 and ³
Bn
P0 ¢ P + ³
Bn
Y ¢(Y ¡·) = 0:
If we sum up these matrices and use the identities ³
An
P 0 + ³
Bn
P 0 = ~ Zn





Y ) ¢ ·P0 and ³
An





Y ) ¢ ·Q, we obtain:
~ Zn
P0 ¢P + ~ Zn
Q ¢ Q + ³
Bn




Y ) ¢ (· ¡ ·P0 ¢ P ¡ ·Q ¢ Q) = 0:
Since ·(P;Q;Y;X) is homogeneous of degree one, the last term vanishes.If we
replace ³
Bn
Y by its value given in Proposition 4, we obtain:
~ Zn
P0 ¢P + ~ Zn
Q ¢ Q + ~ Zn
Y ¢ Y = 0:
Condition 1: The …rst condition comes from the Slutsky negativity ÂQ+ÂY ¢X 6
0 where ÂQ and ÂY are replaced by their values given in Proposition 4.
Condition 2–3: The second and the third conditions result from the homogeneity
of the demand for the exclusive commodity. This implies that ·Q and ·X are
respectively homogeneous of degree zero and of degree one. We use the Euler
equation and simplify.
Condition 4: The fourth condition results from the fact that the conditional




















where we use the values given in Proposition 4. We make equal to zero and
simplify.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Condition 1: The derivatives of the conditional sharing rule ·Q and ·X can be
uniquely identi…ed from any conditional demand n1 or n2. Whether we use the
demand for the n1th good or the demand for the n2th good, however, we must






















or, in matrix form, the conditions in Proposition 6.
Condition 2: To begin with, let us consider, for member A, the Slutsky symme-
try between the exclusive good and the other goods and rearrange. We obtain:
Z

























Y ) ¢·P 0; we obtain:
~ ZP0 +³
B




Y ) ¢ (ZA0 ¡ ·P0):







Y and ·X by their values, we obtain:
~ ZP0 + ~ ZY ¢ ~ Z
0 + ~ ZX ¢ ( ~ ZQ + ~ ZY ¢ X)
0 ¡ ~ ZX ¢ S
X ¢ ~ Z
0
X;
where SX = ( ~ ZY Q= ~ ZY X)+( ~ ZY Y =~ ZY X)¢X > 0 is the opposite of the own-price
substitution e¤ect of the demand for the exclusive good.
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